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Gramsci and the Fourth Wave 
Some scholars and observers were quick to herald the Egyptian mass uprising of 2011 as the 
beginning of a ‘fourth wave of democratization’ (e.g. Gershman 2011). This followed Samuel 
Huntington’s culturalist-ethnical temporalization of modernity’s democratic process into 
three consequent waves. Since the advent of Western colonialism, the countries in the region 
appeared to have been continuously on the road to modernity, without ever really getting 
there. The fourth wave would finally liberate the MENA region from the burden of 
‘persistent authoritarianism’ and Islamic cultural ‘backwardness’. 
 Models of linear modernization only deal with the Other as an isolated and diachronic 
entity. There is no actually shared space-time: as an observer of ‘traditional’ societies one can 
only look back and urge them to ‘catch up’ with the predetermined course of history, i.e. 
capitalist democracy. Against the backdrop of the Other’s particularism and exceptionalism, 
one’s own historical trajectory becomes differentiated, homogenized and normalized. In this 
chapter we criticize the linear and non-contradictory conception of modernization and 
modern culture through a dialogue with the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. We distinguish 
between the logic of capitalism and its real, fractured history. In order to understand the 
dialectic of the universalization of commodity production and the concreteness of capitalist 
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transition we compare the historical trajectory of Western Europe with that of Egypt. The 
totality of modernity is characterized by unevenness and combination, not only of economic, 
but also of political and cultural forces. Gramsci’s Italy functions hereby as a microcosm of 
the uneven and combined nature of modernity. The formation of modern European urban 
culture is discovered as an exceptional and immanent process, rather than the teleological 
outcome of capital accumulation. The Jacobin moment – i.e. the bourgeoisie’s ‘pure’ ethico-
political project, historically expressed in the French Revolution – is quickly subsumed under 
the realities of combined class interests and alliances. Instead of classical bourgeois 
hegemony, a series of passive revolutions become the primary determinants of modernity. 
Precapitalist relations of power and practices of discipline are not replaced by European 
bourgeois leadership, but chiefly integrated into capitalist social formations by Bonapartist 
coercion and the social-technological prestige of American monopoly capitalism. 
 We show how the case of the Egyptian Mahalla al-Kubra textile manufactures 
exemplifies the notable differences and similarities between European and Egyptian 
transitional temporalities. The modernist form of the first indigenous industries obscured their 
precapitalist substance: an extension of absolutist, commercial, landed, and colonial interests 
and social structures. Conversely, the Nasserite intervention reinforced and developed 
concepts and practices of modern urban culture and nationhood, uniting the logical ‘Jacobin’ 
and ‘Bonapartist’ moments, and mobilizing them against (and in accordance with) the 
historical forces of colonialism and imperialism of its time. 
 
The Uneven and Combined Development of Economic and Cultural Forces: Spatial and 
Temporal Configurations 
 
A Marxist analysis of different capitalist cultures starts from the empirical and conceptual 
supposition that ‘transition’ does not mean the linear ‘purification’ of a social formation of all 
non-capitalist structures. The uneven and combined development of capitalism intensified a 
contradictory hierarchy of territorial-economic scales. The asynchronous spatial emergence 
of the capitalist mode of production and the world market posed the problem of how 
precapitalist societies and modes of production related to their capitalist counterparts and to 
the world economy as a whole.  
 One of Gramsci’s main themes in the Prison Notebooks was the uneven and combined 
development of the Italian territory and of capital accumulation (Kipfer 2013: 86). Gramsci 
noticed a distinct difference between precapitalist central institutions and the modern state. 
Communal ties and a moral economy were the main characteristics of precapitalist societies. 
In contrast, the modern state attempted to homogenize its social and cultural territory. It 
abolished the particularist nature of overlapping and fragmented institutional powers based 
upon common law, personal networks and entitlements, despotic powers resting upon 
tradition and the corporatist organisation of economic interests. In European capitalism, cities 
were no longer structured by extra-economic stratified relations, but by the demands of 
production (Morton 2013: 58). The breakthrough of the capitalist mode of production, 
however, is not a simple narrative of immediate successes. In Hegelian terms, the dialectic of 
capital and the universalization of commodity production express a logical becoming, but 
only a historicist analysis can give an overview of the contradictory concreteness of this 
becoming.  
 Contrary to culturalist and post-Marxist interpretations – i.e. subalternity as a purely 
cultural concept or politics-qua-politics, Gramsci emphasised the importance of economic 
processes in the formation of the cultural and invested much time and energy to understand 
Marxist and bourgeois economics (e.g. Krätke and Thomas 2011). Gramsci’s immanent 
critique of the present pushed forward an often misunderstood historicist research agenda that 
aimed to integrate cultural, political and economic phenomena. For example, Henri Lefebvre 
described his notebooks as a political statist critique of the bourgeois state (Kipfer 2008: 
196). Postmodern superstructuralism not only renders every practice autonomous, but also 
refuses to properly deal with Gramsci’s strategic questions regarding the global social 
processes of emancipation by political means. After Mouffe’s plea for a radicalisation of 
bourgeois democracy, a new generation of post-Marxist and autonomists avoided the state 
debate altogether. 
 Regarding the capitalist state, the ideal of a complete Jacobine transformation of a 
national territory contradicts with the concrete different cultural and political temporalities of 
the historical incomplete bourgeois hegemony – a never-ending attempt to create a spatial 
hegemony in order to homogenize time. These uneven and combined spatio-temporal aspects 
of hegemony produce unique articulations of economic structures (capital accumulation) and 
cultural practices (the formation of the identities of capital and labour) (Jessop 2005: 424). 
European modernity is not a homogenous cultural complex in which capitalism came to 
existence. 
 
Gramsci, Modernity, and the False Dichotomy between Urbanity and Rurality in Europe 
 
One of the principal characteristics of Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks is the connection between 
modern culture and state formation. The fascist rise to power exposed the weaknesses of the 
liberal agenda of political hegemony. Throughout the nineteenth century the liberal elite of 
the northern cities and the incumbent politicians in the central government relied heavily on 
the willingness of the bourgeois landowners. They decided whether the state bureaucracy 
could rely on local cooperation in order to exercise the official rule of law. The preservation 
of the mutual interests of the northern industrialists and the southern landowners was based 
upon the social and spatial separation between the two regions (Gramsci 1982 [1929]: 228). 
The North did not only underdevelop the South by restricting infrastructural investments. The 
rural bourgeoisie wished to maintain the status quo between the two regions and of the rural 
social relations within their region. For Gramsci, the Risorgimento created a deficient modern 
Italian state. He articulated the uneven situation of the social formation with the Italian 
temporal and spatial position in the world market, because 
 
the late entrance of peripheral European societies into capitalist relations meant 
that state forms were “less efficient” in creating ideological mechanisms to defer 
the immediate consequences of economic crisis, so that the form of state 
transformations in such cases was circumscribed by prevailing conditions with the 
international capitalist system. 
(Morton 2013: 58) 
 
The social configuration of society could not be mobilized into a national-popular force to 
encompass the complete national space, which reflected in the narrow scope of the political 
discourse of the Italian Moderates. The instable political and economic features of the 
unification were both the inheritance and the further reproduction of a relative backwardness 
of the South with respect to the North (Davis 1979). It did not come as a surprise that 
fascism, notwithstanding their Southern petit bourgeois patriarchal attitude, was able to 
advance itself as the necessary force for an all-encompassing modernization of society. Its 
techno-scientific productivism expressed a desire to overcome the standstill of liberal 
political society. 
 Gramsci’s emphasis on the inheritance and reproduction of backwardness, in order to 
understand modern statehood and political phenomena such as fascism, was related to his 
peculiar perspective of modernity. For Gramsci, modernity entailed the universalization of 
the capitalist mode of production and at the same time the unevenness of this 
universalization. Capitalist modernity expresses, as Massimiliano Tomba has aptly put, a 
‘historical-epochal break’ with the past, because the new social relations are shaped by a 
‘historical condition that comprises a universal history’ (Tomba 2013: 115-20). Nonetheless, 
this historical-epochal break is not a once and for all clear cut between pre-capitalist social 
relations, practices and institutions, and modernity. Capitalist culture in the core countries 
based upon wage labour, contractual obligations, the factory system and the division of 
labour, and the formal political equality of citizenship could not thrive without the integration 
and co-existence of numerous practices of the past. The present forms a historical repetition 
of the same as a necessary basis for new phenomena. Gramsci’s stance towards modernity 
entails a critique of the present state of things from a historical perspective. There is always a 
‘non-identity with itself’ of the present, the ‘non-contemporaneity of the present’ (Thomas 
2009: 282). The homogenous smooth representation of capitalist modernity tends to forget 
the dialectical process, the process of becoming and sublation, between the apparent dead 
past and the living present. This is the theoretical and practical site of critical research and 
political struggle. Gramsci’s historicism consists of a reciprocal relation between his 
historical materialist analysis of the capitalist social formation and his philosophy of praxis, 
in which he finds himself as ‘an element of the contradiction and elevates this element to a 
principle of knowledge and therefore of action’ (Gramsci 1971: 405). Hegemony became a 
key concept in the historical understanding of the rise and degeneration of the bourgeois 
state, modernity and the political practice of elites and subaltern classes (Frosini 2003: 153). 
Gramsci deployed the concept of hegemony in order to rupture, in a historical and logical 
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sense, the self-referentiality and linearity of modernity as the bourgeois epoch: ‘Together 
with the transformation of the state, the labour process, household structures, and workers’ 
subjectivities, urbanization was key to what Gramsci saw as a positive if contradictory 
rationalization of social life’ (Kipfer 2013: 90). Therefore, Gramsci can be used to overcome 
the restrictions of classical Durkheimian sociology and its evolutionary point of view 
regarding the contradictions of the processes of political centralization and civil mentality in 
the economic sphere (Badie and Birnbaum 1983: 12-14). The conceptual deployment of 
hegemony consists of a immanent critique of the present and the representation of modernity 
linked to a laboratory of political practice outside the demarcations of liberal modernity itself. 
 In order to understand capitalist culture, the Gramscian perspective does not proposes 
not a Habermasian ethical opposition between liberal modernity and fascism, nor does it 
simply underscore the post-war Adornian idea of the inherent potentiality of self-destructivity 
of modern society and its mythical roots. Furthermore, it is not sufficient to merely note the 
difference between representation and the critique of its evolutionary narrative. This limited 
form of critique can be noted as deconstructive, constituting modernity as a system ‘which 
inscribes its otherness within its interiority’. The ideological and theoretical problematic will 
be reduced to a ‘strategic skirmish … […] at the level of the mind than at the level of 
political forces’. (Eagleton 1996: 7). Nor can a postmodern and post-colonial alterity as 
absolute distinction from modernity or the intransparent subjectivity be of any clarification 
for the historical development of capitalism (Hartley 2003: 239). Hegemony is thus a 
necessary tool to analyse the political and cultural forces of modernity.  
 Within the Gramscian notion of hegemony and its non-contemporaneity it is possible 
to overcome the false modern dichotomy between city and countryside in classical 
sociological and political thought (Kipfer 2013: 92). Looking closer, the representation of 
two mutually exclusive lifeworlds had its roots in medieval times. First, medieval and early 
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modern politico-economic and moral tractates – as in Aristotle’s antiquity these subjects were 
not differentiated into separated discursive formations of knowledge – were written on behest 
of dominant elites. The image of the perceived peasant subjectivity was created to serve an 
ideological instrumentalisation of the elites ‘as a means toward inverse self-definition’ (Lis 
and Soly 2012: 159). Second, the discursive content and processes of signification of 
instrumentalisation depended on the concrete relations of force and subject dispositions. 
Structural relations and political events together forged the image of the farmer as either a 
virtuous toiler, or an inferior being. The gentry relied on the patriarchal, but at the same time 
uneven, reciprocal commitments and entitlements – i.e. the moral economy. These 
landowners emphasised the passivity of the peasant, glorifying the hardship of rural labour, 
combined with his own imagined benevolence. But peasant revolts were a constant feature in 
feudal times. Landlords accused peasants to be short-sighted in their illiteracy and being a 
force of disruption in the natural order of things. With the introduction of capitalist money-
rent with a purely monetary and contractual character, peasants were perceived as an obstacle 
to the production of a surplus and growth. A new school of agronomists argued against the 
underlying moral ties in the countryside and ‘formulated a new set of values to substantiate 
the rise agriculture  … […they] labelled customary methods of self-sufficient smallholders as 
impediments to progress’ (Lis and Soly: 2012: 203). Capitalist landowners, thriving upon the 
spread of leasehold contracts, did notno longer defined their interests according to the values 
of the moral economy. Third, a distinction has to be made between the ideological image of 
the peasant and the discursive evaluation of the countryside as a source of wealth. In all 
precapitalist societies the predominance of agricultural output and employment, combined 
with the umbra of famine caused by a failed harvest, determined philosophical and utopian 
thought. At the same time, the agricultural feudal characteristics created the specific 
corporatist legal and cultural framework of cities. These cities were not bourgeois islands in 
direct opposition of landlord interests. The old bourgeoisie aligned themselves with 
aristocratic power because their commercial networks relied on political and military support. 
In times of medieval revolt of the subaltern strata, the bourgeoisie failed to overcome their 
corporatist interests and in some cases even supported repression. These corporatist interests 
were expressed in the self-enclosed burgesses’ culture in associations and literary guilds 
(Morris 1983; Heller 2011: 31-2). The success of the commercialization model of early 
modern Europe was the economic result of the particular class configuration and the 
reciprocal restrictions of political action between landed property and urban bourgeoisie 
which lasted several centuries (Dobb 1976: 73-67). A revolution could change the 
articulation of the modes of production oOnly when a historic bloc of the bourgeoisie and 
subaltern classes politically disturbed the balance of forces, in combinationed with a secular 
rural crisis, could a revolution change the articulation of the modes of production (Gramsci 
1996 [1930]: 97).  
 Early modern tractates lacked a profound interrelatedness between cities and 
countryside from the point of production (e.g. the mercantilist William Petty Roncaglia 1985: 
51). It was the body politic that resembled the conceptual focal point of the integration of 
socio-spatial differences. In the eighteenth century, the Physiocrats, the direct forerunners of 
modern economic thought and a main source of inspiration for Adam Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations, expressed the transition towards capitalism as a multi-layered process. Albeit firmly 
rooted in the Enlightenment tradition, they defended, especially François Quesnay, a despotic 
regime of aristocrats with very limited representation (Fox-Genovese 1976). For them, 
agricultural output, as written before, was the only source of limited growth. Cities and its 
inhabitants were considered as the sterile non-productive part of the national state. 
Nonetheless, they defended the modern bourgeois idea of free-trade and the further 
centralization of state institutions and the spatio-judicial homogenisation of the nation. In 
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other words, they proposed some incipient ideas about modern bourgeois rule, albeit directly 
defending their own interests and thus lacking insights about ideological consent and the 
importance of national-popular cultural leadership. But these bourgeois elements were 
nothing more than a remedy for absolutist politics, therefore they culturally represented the 
height of absolutism and its continuous hegemonic crisis. This was, because, on the one hand, 
‘the expansion of production and exchange relations meant that feudal serfdom could no 
longer be politically supported by parceled manorial authority [… ] which required a 
centralized authority’, and, on the other hand, ‘absolutism arose in a transitional period when 
the monarch could play off emerging bourgeoisie and traditional nobility against each other’ 
(Mann 1986: 476-77).  
 The French Revolution signified the definite break with feudalism. The creation of the 
bourgeois state eliminated the moral economy and its particularist cultural and political 
practises and identities. The sphere of civil society was torn from political society, and man 
as a private individual with particular interests was separated from man as a citizen of the 
universal community. Modern society ‘divorced economic practices from their diffuse 
symbolic valences’ (Goux 1990: 122). Yet again, this epochal-historical break consisted of 
many temporalities. It was Marx who wrote the history of the French post-revolutionary 
bourgeois epoch – especially in his ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’. Marx 
sketched as much the making of the French working class as the becoming of a political 
equilibrium between the different factions of capital. In the initial post-Napoleonic years of 
depression the conservative side of the bourgeoisie, the rural bourgeoisie enriched by rent-
seeking opportunities, only supported the central government in its ability to establish a 
political Restoration. The most striking feature was the relative absence of industrial capital. 
The early Jacobine state removed institutional and judicial barriers for the bourgeoisie in 
order to accommodate accumulation, for example the abolition of guilds and common law 
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entitlements, but soon it became clear that the republican loyalists in the ranks of the middle 
and lower bourgeoisie opted for traditional economic activities such as money-lending, and 
the buying and selling of land property (Kriedte 1983: 154-55; Versieren 2013). Between 
1830 and 1848 concentrated money-capital used the July Monarchy as a ‘a joint stock 
company for the exploitation of France's national wealth’ (Marx 1978 [1850]: 52). As long as 
credit was available for the rural bourgeoisie mutual agreements were possible. But 
underinvestment, lack of industrial productive growth and political instability forced these 
elites to take recourse to a Bonapartist regime, which led to the gradual economic integration 
of commercial, industrial and money-capital. But this Bonapartist regime meant the gradual 
dissolution and sublation of the Jacobine bourgeois hegemonic project and the moral-
intellectual content of the integral class-state ‘vis-à-vis civil society – the organic unity of the 
class-as-nation (Mann 1986: 472). The passivity of the subaltern classes and its cultural-
political alienation from the dominant class led the Bonapartist regime to its inevitable 
downfall. The bourgeois project encountered its organic crisis, politically and ideologically, 
as ‘the working classes’ revolt … […] demanding instead political forms adequate to their 
own emergent class project … […] then began an epoch of passive revolution’ (Thomas 
2009: 145-46). The passive revolution consisted of a series of small-scale economic reforms 
that initiated molecular transformations, and which were based on the partial hegemony of 
one or more class fractions over the other ruling and subaltern social layers. ‘Passive 
revolution’ is Gramsci’s interpretation of ‘... the persistent capacity of initiative of the 
bourgeoisie which succeeds, even in the historical phase in which it has ceased to be a 
properly revolutionary class, to produce socio-political transformations, sometimes of 
significance, conserving securely in its own hands power, initiative and hegemony, and 
leaving the working classes in their condition of subalternity’ (Losurdo, in Thomas 2009: 
197). The intensified class struggle and ideological oppositions need to be contained and 
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articulated by the integral state, thus a passive revolution aims to restructure the coherence of 
a social formation and its state power within a further process of uneven and combined socio-
geographical development (Morton 2013: 59). 
 
Gramsci and the Passive Revolution of Social and Cultural Sciences: Rurality, Urbanity and 
Americanism 
 
The period of passive revolution until World War One ignited a proliferation of social, 
cultural and economic theories about the modern condition and its hegemonic aspirations. 
Bourgeois theorists struggled with the attempt to reconcile the Jacobine discursive formation 
about individualism and autonomy with the collective character of mass politics. In 
economics, a moral-intellectual conservatism took place. The ‘marginalist revolution’ in 
economics aimed to discipline the labour market by both erasing the concept of class and 
claiming that the struggle for a higher value of labour power equated to the complete 
disruption of the economy. In social theory individualist rationality was linked to intentional 
functionalism and value-free descriptive realism. But the lack of legitimacy of bourgeois 
values could not be remedied by a simple acceptance and formal endorsement of the state of 
facts. Durkheim invented a moderate communitarian model of individual freedom of civil 
subjects together with a range of social responsibilities stemming from tradition and informal 
social control. In his analysis of the social collective consciousness Durkheim affirmed his a-
social individualist and realist concept of ideology, failing to answer the question ‘by means 
of what concepts are […] institutions and practices demonstrated to be the object of the 
science of sociology?’ (Hirst 1975: 100). Durkheim’s methodological inability to render 
ideology in its proper conceptual terms can be tracked in his point of view regarding urban 
and rural life. In a country with almost half of the population in the rural sectors – the 
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impoverished farmers trying to meet ends with putting-out textile production – and a 
significant niche craft-production by small-scale industry, the ideal image of modernity 
conflicted with everyday economic life (Kemp 1971; Liu 1994). Throughout Durkheim’s 
writings on modern phenomena a classical tension can be detected between an rather 
nostalgic evaluation of precapitalist communal ties in rural villages and the experienced 
anomie of modern city life. But his call for a vague form of solidarity to combat the 
disintegrative tendencies of urban mentality and the social division of labour lacked any 
dialectical analysis of the relations of force and ideological processes that tied urban life and 
countryside together. For example, he practically dismissed any qualitative difference 
between communal identities and the modern proletarian political struggle. For him, ‘the 
traditional community has enshrined class-conscious working-class values and some 
conception of shared collective responsibility and, as well, shares a collective memory with 
venerated historical events and personages’ (Chorney 1990: 76). Compared to the Gramscian 
or Thompsonian historicist examples of the qualitative jump from a corporatist to a class-
based struggle of the proletariat, Durkheim eliminated the ideological shifts of counter-
hegemonic movements. The same can be noted about Max Weber in Germany, but in a 
different form. Weber mediated his seemingly a-ideological individualism with the 
aspirations of the conservative nationalist réveil in a young nation, calling forth the cultural 
ideals of democratic bourgeois elitism (Mommsen 1974: 22-46; Scott 2000: 40-42). Yet 
again, his unblinking support for bourgeois modernization of the economic sphere and his 
condemnation of the rural and urban moral economy did not resolve the pressing agrarian 
question and the ensuing fact of unevenness between the industrial West and the Junker-
dominated rural East.  
 Gramsci succeeded to surpass and exceed the ideological and conceptual limitation of 
classical bourgeois social and cultural thinkers. In order to understand the new dialectical 
unity between city and countryside and the related question of hegemony, he underscored the 
importance of changing spatial scales (Morton 2013). Whilst in precapitalist times the cities 
relied on the hinterland in order to thrive and to gain regional or international dominance of 
some niche production or long-distance trade, most output was being consumed locally or 
regionally. The emergence of the economies of scale within the capitalist world market 
developed in interaction with the constellation of modern nation-states. The city became the 
most important nexus of production, a new social and cultural-symbolic territory, fuelled by a 
stream of landless farmers. Early on, the novelty of urban culture as a set of ‘new principles’ 
of living – the social costs of the new labour process – was already recorded by scientists and 
governmental institutions (e.g. Fielden 1834; Cooke Taylor 1844). Gramsci and Marx, 
discussing the French and Italian transition towards capitalist modernity, attempted to 
redefine the class content of the relation between city and countryside. The most important 
question is how urban culture, expressing new forms of class solidarity, became ideologically 
self-conscious about its socio-spatial impact on the social formation as a whole: 
 
Gramsci saw modern(ist) urbanization as key to the demographic reordering of 
the ‘terrain’ of hegemony … […] and interpreted urban space … […] as key 
‘ideological material’ for bourgeois rule … […] he was unambiguous about the 
positive role urban transformations could play in multiscalar, spatially and 
temporally differentiated wars of position … […] Gramsci hoped that industrial 
action and political self-organization in Turin would join up with the land 
occupations hat swept through northern and southern agricultural zones … […] 
and thus lay the basis for a final war of movement – the takeover of the heights of 
bourgeois power in Milan and Rome. 
(Kipfer 2013: 90-91). 
 Thus, both neither the deficient bourgeois rule and nor its proletarian contender had not the 
decisive hegemonic upper hand when they only exerted the urban war of position. The spatial 
differentiations need to be tied together in order to fully understand the non-
contemporaneinity of hegemonic practices. At the right, combined with the wartime 
experiences of the total mobilisation of national resources, the technicist and technocratic 
fetish of Americanism attracted both liberals, conservatives as nationalists. The United States, 
not ‘burdened’ by the past of feudalism and communal forms of living, exported a renewed 
bourgeois scientific culture of Taylorism. It brought the promise of the eradication of 
backwardness in the exponential intensity of the social division of labour in the production 
process. The pure form of bourgeois modernity in the ideological images of Americanism 
mirrored the ‘imperfections’ of the European origins and development of the capitalist mode 
of production (Gramsci 1982 [1929]: 167, 188-89, 220-23).  
 The spread of Americanism under monopoly capitalism happened at different 
economic scales. Monopoly capitalism increased labour and capital productivity, the final 
real subsumption of labour, which increased the spatial integration of the social units of the 
world market and the importance thereof (Massey 1984: 46-53). Within factory walls, it 
became clear that the early European capitalist process still relied on a combination of 
premodern and capitalist disciplinary practices, which shaped modern property relations and 
relations of force: the daily selection of the unskilled labour force at the factory gate,; 
monopolising knowledge of skills of former independent artisans by contractual obligations,; 
the promulgation of rules and monetary penalties,; spatial compartmentalization,; the system 
of overseers,; and the enhancement of vertical hierarchy by bringing in domestic relations. 
This strategy of microphysical power was highly problematic in terms of pure economic 
efficiency – surplus extraction. For example, ‘at a time when manufacturing still depended on 
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craft knowledge or on the secret know-how of the overlookers and foremen, graded monetary 
sanctions gave owners the only feasible check on, and evaluation of, the overlookers’ loyalty 
and efficiency’ (Biernacki 1995: 195). In addition, loyalty could be procured by playing the 
communal card of kinship and ethnicity: the hiring of families of workers and overseers 
outside the locality (e.g. Lis & Soly 1987: 75-76). The factory owners legitimised their 
disciplinary practices through a heterodox discursive strategy. First there was a patriarchal 
call for obedience and the conceptualisation of the factory floor as a natural chain of 
command. Second, the individual prudence and sense of duty of both capitalist and worker 
was mobilized. The labourer had the contractual duty to deliver a certain amount of 
commodities to the capitalist, whose profits relied on a standardised method of sale. Third, it 
was argued that both wage and profit depended on the competiveness of all ‘participants’ of 
production in a free-trade economic society. Fourth there was an appeal to Christian virtuous 
Christian work regarding diligence and piety (Versieren 2013). Taylorism used the principle 
of the division of labour to atomize and disarm the potential resistance of proletarian and 
communal subjectivity of the worker. In other words, its spatial division is not a matter of just 
measuring the expanding size of the company, because Taylorism established the economic 
and cultural form of the social nature of property relations within the political framework of a 
passive revolution (e.g. Massey 1984: 27). The transformed microphysics of power on the 
factory floor reflected the changing ideological determination of the labour market. In the 
centuries before early capitalism state coercion and local authorities had been the most 
important source of regulation of labour practices and its role in commercial and productive 
activities (Mann 1986: 461; Biernacki 1995: 214-45). No culture existed which promoted the 
creation of an exchange market for labour power. Monopoly capitalism, unleashing the 
productive powers through the dissemination of Americanism as the pure ideological 
representation and cultural practice, showed a remarkable resemblance with the political logic 
of the integral state (Gramsci 2007 [1930]: 11). The top-down hierarchy of overseers and the 
culture of master and servant gradually mutated into a layered system of molecular co-
optation of workers into the daily management of the production process. A ‘passive 
revolution’ in the factory was necessary because its formerly direct forms of discipline 
contradicted the exponential growth of the division of labour., This situationand thus 
‘aggravates control problems and potentially puts the power of the ruler into further jeopardy 
… […] Those in power become dependent on experts who are much harder to control than 
those whose work is open to common-sense evaluation’ (Rueschemeyer 1984: 54). The 
exercise of power became more and more anonymous, in which the concrete diffusion of 
individual ownership, absentee ownership, blended with collusive management of 
administration and engineers (Veblen 1997 [1923]: 210-14). Nonetheless, in both early 
liberal capitalism and monopoly capitalism status according to the position in the production 
process could not be divorced from cultural and political transformations. The social 
evaluation of skills cannot be reduced to a technical point of view. On a macro-scale, political 
struggle brought an urban proletarian culture into existence. The organization of the national 
economy, especially the socio-spatial relationships between the different class factions of 
capitalists vis-à-vis the subaltern forces, is itself the object of the very same struggle (Massey 
1984: 41-43). Fordism expressed the cultural and political reconfiguration of labour under the 
expanding role of the integral state. It integrated class struggle, which became a structural 
element of cyclical capitalist crisis. 
 
Gramsci in Egypt: The Making of Modern Culture and the Spectres of Colonialism and 
Feudalism 
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The case of the Mahalla al-Kubra textile manufactures exemplifies the notable differences 
and similarities between European and Egyptian transitional temporalities. It cannot be 
considered as the inevitable making of capitalist culture on micro-scale, but rather the ‘further 
innovation and perfection of artisanal weaving process’ (Hammad 2009: 36). From 
Muhammed Ali until Nasser the early manufactures and urban corporatist structures 
resembled some of the key characteristics of the commercialization model of early modern 
Europe. Thus the thesis that merchant capitalism in Ottoman times or the emergence of 
manufacturing under Muhammed Ali directly led to modern capitalism lacks evidence and 
coherence (Abdel-Malek 1983: 122; Khafaji 2004: 43). As in Europe, this commercialization 
of society reached its apex in a precapitalist cultural context. A few manufactures, additional 
rural ‘proto-industrial’ production, conflicts between merchants and craftsmen, 
subcontracting between and within guilds, all these phenomena were intricately linked to a 
predominant tributary mode of production with its own history of succeeding phases of 
centralization and decentralization of surplus extraction by the Ottoman sultanate, the 
Mamluk dynasty and local landlords – a rhythm, that only ended with the decolonization of 
Egypt.  
 Under Mamluk and Ottoman The surplus product of rural households was extracted 
through taxation – the multazim gentry bought the right to collect taxes and brought the tax in 
kind to the urban market - and extra labour was expropriated through sharecropping, corvée 
and informal wage labour (Beinin 2001: 25; Tucker 2005 [1979]: 230). Surpluses were not 
reinvested in agricultural production, but flowed directly to the cities which became rich 
centres of trade, guild handicrafts, and state administration within the framework of a 
decentralised command economy (Hanna 2011: 37). In the cities Mamluk military rulers or 
the Ottoman administration supported a policy of provisionalism – the control of the food 
markets in order to prevent urban riots – but neglected the necessary protectionist measures to 
support handicraft production (Parthasarathi 2011). Egyptian merchants invested in political 
networks, architectural imagery of opulence and above all in the secured return of tax farms. 
In the middle of the seventeenth century the upward economic cycle presented new 
opportunities for the urban populace (Raymond 2002). Until that time, the guilds had an 
egalitarian institutional culture, and possessed real political influence. Later Ottoman rule 
demoted the political strength and autonomy of guilds as an important source of taxation. In 
comparison with their European counterparts Egyptian cities could not draw ‘upon any 
concept of juridic or corporate personality to counteract the Islamic doctrine of oneness’ and 
remained ‘vulnerable to government interference’ (Ayubi 1995: 165). Nonetheless, guilds 
continued to play the pivotal role in the urban moral economy. When urban production 
expanded, the internal egalitarian organisation slowly slipped into an oligopoly of a few 
master craftsmen, whose income and status rose because of their intense involvement with 
rich merchants and having different systems of subcontracting (Hanna 2011: 100-2). The 
moral economy of urban culture did not break down, but rather became verticalised (Khafaji 
1984: 111). 
 Muhammad Ali’s ‘modern’ centralized mercantilist policies were primarily oriented 
towards the needs of a military bureaucracy, relying on the new feudal landlords and 
traditional elites in provincial towns, and curtailing the power of urban guilds and merchant 
capital. He attempted to control handicraft production, commercial exchange and the input of 
raw agricultural material. This closely resembled the political economy of European 
absolutism and created internal obstructions towards the development of an indigenous 
industrial capitalism (Khafaji 2004: 42; Abbas and El-Dessouky 2011: 60-63). Muhammed 
Ali resorted to violence to force peasants into the system of cash- and sharecropping, which 
was met with local revolts, but eventually led to the crisis of the old family-patriarchal 
household economy (Sayyid-Marsot 1984: 152-57; Khafaji 2004: 31; Abbas and El-
Dessouky 2011: 12). Feudal private property rights undermined the rural household 
economy. In response to feudalisation, the village elite strengthened the stratification of 
everyday life (Habib 1985: 47).  
 At the third quarter of the nineteenth century British colonialism fully integrated 
Egypt into the world market. Nonetheless, at the scale of the social formation a profound 
articulated unevenness and combination existed between feudal rural communal life and its 
output in the form of sharecropping for export purposes, handicraft production in cities and 
rural villages alongside the proletarianization of labour in transport and intermediary 
commercial activities, and capitalist rentier activities of banks and credit companies of both 
Egyptian and foreign ownership (Versieren and De Smet 2014). As time passed by, the lack 
of political and ideological hegemony of and the unity between the royal elite, feudal 
landowners and colonial forces surfaced in times of intense political crisis. Power relations 
were still based upon local and ethnical clientilism.  
 Within this framework,  the Mahalla al-Kubra manufacturinges appeared to be as a 
completely peripheral, with regards both toin output and relative importance. Foreign 
capitalists politically and economically defended this articulation of precapitalist and 
capitalist modes of productions, which effectively blocked economic development. 
Culturally, foreign companies imported new bookkeeping, engineering and state 
administration techniques. This incentive promoted the technical education of provincial state 
employees, being who were an intermediate class, but the mismatch between the amount of 
hiring and the available group of new intellectuals created a growing frustration about the 
limitation of social mobility (Podeh and Winckler 2004: 8). Communal ties remained strong 
between these intellectuals, ‘effendiyya’, and the provincial background, because for high-
ranking positions the state opted for employing foreigners. At the same time, notwithstanding 
the import of the aforementioned techniques, the British colonial administration in concert 
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with the rural and merchant elites tried to contain the dissemination of a modern intellectual 
culture. These intellectuals, mainly gathered in the liberal nationalist Wafd Party, were under 
the patronage of Egyptian big landowners and merchants and shared some common images 
about the ‘ignorant peasantry’, which, when having government responsibilities, limited their 
capabilities to articulate an hegemonic national-popular programme (Ayubi 1995: 107; Abbas 
and El-Dessouky 2011: 192). The disillusions about the decisions of Wafd in interwar years 
created an autonomous political subaltern force with nationalist sentiments, albeit 
ideologically divided. Even though everyday cultural communal ties between the new stratum 
of intellectuals and the subaltern classes existed, both sides attracted and repulsed each other 
according to growing cultural differences and political events. The middle-class intellectuals 
adopted the Enlightenment ideas of sovereignty, liberal civic values and economic 
modernisation. But until Nasser the articulation of modernization, equality and the communal 
discourse of the common good had not been made successfully. New marriage strategies 
brought the elites of foreign descent and Egyptians closer, but at the same time they further 
alienated themselves from their farmer-tenants because of an exuberant urban lifestyle, and, 
because of an increased socio-spatial separation, as they moved to the metropole,. The 
repertoire of oppositional groups addressed the elite’s failure toof promoteing the common 
good, but also demanded that they would invest in the modernisation of the economy and in 
the education of the Egyptian people (Hammad 2009: 31; Abbas and El-Dessouky 2011: 82; 
187). This elitist culture expressed the uneven relation between the resident metropole and 
the hinterland, an important feudal phenomenon similar to European feudalization when the 
immediate ties of personalistic loyalty loosened (Mann 1973). In the eyes of provincial towns 
and villages the metropole was parasitic and thrived upon residential expansion, consumption 
of luxury goods and commercial market networks. In major cities the blossoming world trade 
realized large profits for the rural elites, stimulating a new urban financial sphere of credit, 
loans and banking around landed property (Richards and Waterbury 2008: 38–40). This new 
commercial domain gave rise to a renewed merchant class in the cities, and intensified the 
economic ties between feudal rurality and the rentier metropole. Smaller cities functioned as 
satellite intermediaries between rural villages, and Cairo and Alexandria. As in Europe, they 
were imbedded in the rural countryside with local production and small-scale specialization. 
A few could benefit from their strategic position along transportation routes or functioning as 
agricultural hubs (Hammad 2009: 38-9). The urban culture of smaller cities was based upon 
spatial separation: a profound social differentiation linked to a provincial mentality of local 
elites.  
 The establishment of new textile manufactures in the interwar years did not produce a 
definite historical-epochal break with the precapitalist past. It was as much the final success 
of the feudal-absolutist commercialisation model as a first step to industrial capitalism. 
Similar to early modern Europe ‘rural and domestic handicrafts did not simply disappear in 
the face of the development of manufacture … […] they coexisted with and were reorganized 
by manufacture, … […] always rested on the handicrafts of towns and the domestic 
subsidiary industries of rural districts, over time destroying these in one form and resurrecting 
them in another’ (Heller 2011: 182). Contrary to the European countries the profits derived 
from the new rural-urban ‘proto-industrial’ networks did not flow to the richest layer of 
master craftsmen or merchants – the old and new bourgeoisie (Mann 1986: 465). Instead, 
feudal landlords integrated these commercial networks into their rural rentier interests fuelled 
by easy credit and higher money rents (Abbas and El-Dessouky 2011: 53). Guild members, 
stripped of their former institutional corporate rights, refused to work in the manufacturinges 
and slowly joined the ranks of the proletarianised urban workforce. In addition, before the 
First World War fierce local labour strikes took place at colonial companies and the public 
sector in collocationcollaborated with the guilds in protest (Toledano 1990). Only after the 
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war did a proletarian culture began to develop organically with the communal-corporate 
ethics of the dwindling guilds and neighbourhood solidarities, resulting in a co-existence of 
both vertical class and horizontal communal relations.  
 After the Europeans built the first ginning factories, the Egyptian landlord owners of 
the Mahalla al-Kubra manufacturinges channelled the surplus labour of their estates through 
the factory gates with the help of well-educated effendiyya–management and illiterate 
community-based violent foremen (Abu-Lughod 1984: 102; Hammad 2009: 46). These 
landowners wanted to diversify their investments, but at the same time they extended their 
already existing influence in the agricultural sector (Khafaji 2004: 53-54; Abbas and El-
Dessouky 2011: 92). Malhalla al-Kubra cannot be understood as an industrial novelty, but 
rather as the integration of agricultural monocropping output and derivative textile activities 
(Hammad 2009: 40). Land labourers and peasants were preferable as a cheap labour source 
because of their communal rural ties – the importation of rural cultural and social relations of 
production. The basic ‘labour unit’ was not the individual worker, but the extended family. 
Kinship and the proximity of ethnical ties primarily defined their cultural life-world, and its 
hierarchical component was exploited by administration and overseers in order to keep 
discipline and to negate the divided authority in a preliminary process of the division of 
labour (Rueschemeyer 1984: 56-61). Both foreign and Egyptian industrial textile activities 
changed as much the outlook of the city as they reaffirmed the divided communal lines of 
cultural demarcation and segregation. With the help of state finances, landlords and 
foreigners built new residential quarters with parks and modern public buildings. Slumps, 
housing seasonal factory workers and recreating the original rural village environment, were 
added to the narrow streets of the old medieval silk centre. As the manufactures expanded, so 
did the demand for services in the rich quarters. In this transitional city life cultural and 
spatial divisions were being crossed, which created a vague sense of class distinctions 
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(Hammad 2009: 26-52). Slowly and after years of fierce conflict, the initial hostility of urban 
dwellers towards the workers began to change into a sense of shared interests. Factory 
management, understanding that coercion did not suffice, tried to contain the disgruntled 
workers with the rent of their own factory houses as a renewed effort to procure obedience 
and docility. This measure was part of a disciplinary repertoire that enabled management to 
supervise and control the everyday life – and thus resistance – of the workers, which 
resembled closely the practices of the first generations of European patriarchal factory 
owners. Factory housing also limited the mobility of seasonal workers: losing a job implied 
the loss of housing. These means of control made the workers adapt to ‘the industrial life and 
choose when to imitate and when to differ from the model of a modern worker-subject as it 
was imposed upon them by the Company and the state’ (Hammad 2009: 62). In the end, the 
burden of patriarchal culture with no regard to efficient productivity or skill acquirement – 
the introduction of the factory clock or apprenticeship had only a coercive function – drove 
down the rate of profit, provoked Luddite destruction of machinery and ultimately expressed 
the inability to mediate new social relations of production. This culture prevented a smooth 
exchange of technology and knowledge and the accumulation of additional increments of 
established useful knowledge (Scott 2006: 113-14; Storper 2013: 55). 
 Until the Second World War the different generations of manufacturers expressed the 
fixed and stalled transitional temporalities of the Egyptian social formation: outdated 
technology, inefficient discipline culture, mix of traditional and modern trade networks, 
communal particularism, crowding out of handicraft products by import of western 
commodities, and precapitalist solidarities combined with an incipient proletarian class 
consciousness. Political and social groups lacked a self-defined sense of identity vis-à-vis a 
conceptualised form of social totality. The Second World War as an economic and political 
event broke down the instable configuration of dominant forces. Less than a decade later, the 
Nasserite regime, Bonapartist and Caesarist in essence (see De Smet 2014), gradually 
replaced the old feudal landowner class by rich semi-capitalist farmers and initiated a state 
capitalist industrial project.  
 In political and cultural terms, Nasser radically differed from his long line of 
predecessors. He adopted the anti-feudal modernization discourse of liberal and socialist 
movements and the nationalist sentiments of the subaltern classes in order to break with the 
feudal-absolutist-colonial deadlock. Nasser reconfigured the relationship between urbanity 
and rurality. He improved the living conditions of the urban workers and initiated a planned 
reorganisation of the city scape. In an effort to turn itself into a top-down hegemonic force, 
the regime superseded the political strategy of communists, socialists and liberals in forging a 
link between factory floor and local and national party headquarters. Other political 
contenders never succeeded in connecting the metropole with the struggle in provincial 
towns. Land reforms and rural cooperatives served a twofold purpose: winning over the 
goodwill of mainly the middle farmer and a surplus syphoning for industrial investment goals 
(Versieren and De Smet 2014).  
 With the spread of mass propaganda and the instalment of educational and cultural 
initiatives the Nasserite state created a novel, explicitly national and modern civil culture. 
The old corporatism was overcome through the forceful establishment of a new, state-driven 
corporatism. Although the ‘popular classes’ became the protagonists of the national play, it 
was the regime that wrote the script of their mobilization. The bureaucratic nature of the 
political hegemony was inherently fragile because it could not supersede the people/power 
bloc contradiction. On the one hand, the Nasserite intervention strongly interpellated a 
political and cultural people-nation, forging a new hegemonic bloc that temporary displaced 
existing social contradictions. On the other hand, the regime tended to reduce the problem of 
modernity and hegemony to the technical question of industrialisation, raising productivity, 
and the technicality of a division of labour (see Laclau 1977). Thus the new regime faced the 
insurmountable problem of creating a modern class project that could articulate the still fluid 
and transitory social relations. The authoritarian nature of the Nasserite state and its 
‘overdevelopment’ was an inadequate response to manage social conflicts, in which ‘the 
intermediate strata come to achieve an inordinate importance as a social base of state … 
[…these strata] are often in a state of flux and transition, and as the entire class map is quite 
fluid and uncertain … […these strata] switch and reverse their ideological and political 
allegiance practically overnight’ (Ayubi 1995: 182). The downfall of Nasserism signalled the 
end of the Egyptian Jacobin moment, leading to an instable cycle of passive revolutions, 
embedded within neoliberal and rentier logics, from Sadat over Mubarak to the current 
regime (De Smet 2014). The Egyptian case of different cultural and social temporalities could 
not be articulated successfully, which thus leading to a rather permanent state of organic 
crisis. There remained few routes to a socio-spatial escape from the past to create new 
localizations of industry, which prevented the emergence of a modern urban culture 
according to production (Storper 1991: 68; Storper and Walker 1989: 71-72).  
 
Waves of Passive Revolution 
 
Returning to Huntington’s ‘waves of democratization’, we conclude that we cannot simply 
look back and urge the Other, who is presumed to follow in our footsteps, to ‘catch up’. The 
universalization of commodity production went hand in hand with a generalization of a 
shared space-time. However, particular social structures were not simply assimilated into the 
universalist capitalist project; sometimes they resisted transformations, allied with capitalist 
forms, or even subjugated those forms to their interests. We have shown that the early 
European capitalist process still relied on a combination of premodern and capitalist 
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disciplinary practices, which shaped modern property relations and relations of force. 
Similarly, the colonial and independent industries of Egypt until the Second World War were 
incorporated into absolutist, landed, and commercial capitalist structures. They did not 
produce a definite historical-epochal rupture with the precapitalist past. It was as much the 
final success of the feudal-absolutist commercialisation model as a first step to industrial 
capitalism. However, Bbecause of the shared space-time, however, Egypt did not simply 
repeatlicate in isolation the European process in isolation, but its diachronic development as a 
part of capitalism was intersected by its synchronic existence within the whole of the 
capitalist world market and the modern nation state system.  
 In Europe, industry created the bourgeoisie as a ruling class, just as it created the 
worker as a proletarian, whereas in Egypt, industry was created by an already existing hybrid 
of landed, commercial, and colonial capital as an expansion of their rentier income. Despite 
its modernist features, the Egyptian factory reproduced precapitalist kinship, religious and 
ethnical social relations, and cultural hierarchies. The profit motive was burdened with 
patriarchal principles of discipline and violence to keep the workforce in check. 
Despite the social space of the workplace, a modern working class culture began to emerge 
organically, arising from struggles in the workplace and the shared and contested spaces of 
the city. In the political field, immanent working class subjectivities were primarily 
articulated along nationalist and anti-imperialist lines, and after the Second World War the 
workers’ movement played a fundamental role in the resistance against British influence. 
Urban proletarian culture became one of the pillars of a modern, Egyptian, national culture in 
the years leading up to the Free Officers’ coup in 1952. 
 This immanent urban culture was subsumed under the Nasserite project of ‘Arab 
socialism’, which united both the ‘Jacobin’ and ‘Bonapartist’ moments of Egypt’s modernity, 
in the sense that the mass protests and the coup of 1952 rendered revolution and restoration 
logically and historically contemporaneous. Just as in the Italian case, the rupture with the 
precapitalist era was not realized by classical bourgeois democracy, but by an authoritarian 
state. Passive revolution, rather than bourgeois democracy, appears as the more correct 
criterion through which to interpret the cultural trajectory of urban modernity, both in the 
West and in Egypt. 
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